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Abstract
We analyze the two goals behind the European Bologna Process
of increasing student mobility: enabling graduates to develop multi–
cultural skills and increasing the quality of universities. We isolate
three effects: 1) a competition effect that raises quality; 2) a free rider
effect that lowers quality; 3) a composition effect that influences the
relative strengths of the two previous effects. The effects lead to a
trade–off between the two goals. Full mobility may be optimal, only
when externalities are high. In this case, student mobility yields inef-
ficiently high educational quality. For moderate externalities partial
mobility is optimal and yields an inefficiently low quality of education.
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1 Introduction
The so–called Bologna Process belongs to those European policy processes
that have attracted considerable public attention. Its intention is to harmo-
nize the diverse European university systems and, thereby, achieve a higher
degree of comparability. It is hoped that more comparable university sys-
tems lead to higher student mobility. Thus, the Bologna Process can be
understood as a process of increasing student mobility. For two reasons,
student mobility is seen as key in increasing the productivity of the highly
educated. First, student mobility across countries exposes students directly
to the different European cultures and helps them to develop their multi–
cultural skills. These skills are seen as indispensable in a European Union
that strives for full economic integration while preserving the diversity of its
cultures.1 Second, increasing student mobility is hoped to kindle a compe-
tition between countries to attract the most able students. Since university
education in Europe is essentially free, the dimension in which such compe-
tition takes place is quality. Hence, it is hoped that higher mobility raises
university quality. This would increase the productivity of graduates further.
This paper analyzes the two rationales behind the Bologna Process to
increase student mobility: enabling graduates to develop their multi–cultural
skills and increasing quality competition between universities. We study
how these two goals can be achieved and in how far they are compatible
with each other. Thus, we present a framework in which the productivity of
students depends both on multi–cultural skills and the quality of university
education. Within this setup we compare and evaluate, for different levels
of student mobility, the expenditures in higher education that are chosen by
two symmetric, benevolent governments.
Our main result is that the claimed competition effect which is supposed
to raise quality is rather unlikely to occur; it happens only if the external-
ity generated by foreign students is high enough. Indeed, in order for the
competition effect to raise quality, it must overcome the free rider effect that
countries prefer their students to obtain their costly education abroad. Only
if students are relatively unlikely to return from a foreign education and only
if a country is able to appropriate a large share of a foreigner’s productivity,
1See for instance Jahr, et al. (2002, p. 50ff).
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does the positive competition effect occur. Yet, for more reasonable values
of the students’ return probabilities and appropriation of their productivity,
the free riding effect outweighs the competition effect. Hence, with respect
to the Bologna Process it seems more reasonable to expect that increased
student mobility actually lowers university quality.
As a result, student mobility yields a trade–off between an acquisition of
multi–cultural skills and the quality of university education. Higher student
mobility facilitates the acquisition of multi–cultural skills at the expense of
lower investments in higher education. The optimal level of student mobility
will depend on the outcome of this trade–off. Essentially, a higher mobility
of students is called for when multi–cultural skills are more important. In
contrast, if the free riding effect is stronger, less mobility is preferred.
We study how the trade–off varies for different degrees of student mobil-
ity. We thereby obtain a non–monotonic relationship; the competition effect
is strongest when student mobility is low. The reason for this is that we
model student mobility as a process that facilitates information processing.
This captures the idea behind the Bologna process that more comparable uni-
versity systems facilitate the decision process of a student to study abroad.
Thus, we interpret higher student mobility as a reduction of the student’s
information processing ability that is required for making the decision to
study abroad. In addition, the student’s ability to process information also
affects his benefits from university education; more talented students achieve
a higher productivity than less able students. As a consequence, a rise in
student mobility lowers the talent pool of mobile students. This composi-
tion effect causes a decline in the competition effect; with higher mobility it
becomes less attractive for a country to attract the students, because their
average talent, and therefore their expected productivity, will be lower.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
discusses related literature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 charac-
terizes the first best optimum. Sections 5 and 7 discuss the extreme cases
with student immobility and full student mobility, respectively. Section 8
analyses the properties of the second best optimum for intermediate degrees
of student mobility. The final section concludes. All formal proofs are col-
lected in the appendix.
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2 Related Literature
The relation between mobility and human capital has for long been on the
agenda of economic research. The larger part of the literature that deals
with this topic analyses the consequences which increasing mobility of skilled
labour might have on human capital investments. The characteristic time
structure of these models includes the assumption that individuals have to
decide about their educational effort or costs before they eventually become
mobile.
Within this framework, the Brain Drain literature identifies two main
consequences which increasing mobility of highly productive labour will have
on human capital investments. Firstly, as pointed out by Grubel and Scott
(1966) and Bhangwati and Hamada (1974) in an asymmetric setting with
a pure sender country and a pure receiver country, the sender country will
reduce its public investment in education if an increasing fraction of highly ed-
ucated individuals leaves the country. Similarly, Justman and Thisse (1997)
show that in symmetric settings, too, where each country is both sender and
receiver country, exogeneous mobility of graduates leads to an underprovision
of publicly provided education.
By contrast, Stark et al. (1997), Beine et al. (2001) and Stark and
Wang (2002) take also private investments in education into account. They
demonstrate that with one poor sender country and one rich receiver country,
the reduction in public provision of education in the sender country can be
overcompensated by the increase of private investments due to the rising
private returns to education if highly skilled labour becomes more mobile.
Poutvaara (2004a) and (2004b) also consider both public and private
investment in education. Poutvaara shows that although increasing inter-
national applicability of education leads to higher private investments, the
governments tend to reduce public funds for internationally applicable edu-
cation.
Thus, the most stable result that is established by this kind of literature
is that although increasing mobility of graduates will lead to higher private
investments in education, public provision will decrease. The governments
will tend to free ride on the education system of the other country.
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Bu¨ttner and Schwager (2004) produce a similar result within a different
framework. Their paper belongs to the small part of the literature on ed-
ucation economics that explicitly focuses on the consequences of increasing
student mobility. Here, the time structure is different. Students are already
mobile when they have to decide about their educational investment; and
they are able to choose the country in which they want to study. Bu¨ttner
and Schwager (2004) show that if students are mobile, welfare states want to
free ride on the education system of the other country, so that in equilibrium,
public provision of education is too low.
Kemnitz (2005), by contrast, considers not only the free rider effect, but
also the competition effect of governments that provide education for mobile
students. If students generate positive expected externalities in the country
in which they study, the incentive to free ride on the neighbouring country’s
education system is not the only incentive at work. It may be profitable for
the government to raise its funds in order to attract more students. The ques-
tion which of the two effects prevails depends on the relative importance of
the positive externalities and the costs that are generated by students. Kem-
nitz (2005) compares free rider and competition effect within a framework
where the governments are driven by exploitative incentives.
In relation to the existing literature, our focus is on the effects of student
mobility on public provision of education with benevolent governments. Our
contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, we compare the free
rider effect and the competition effect within a symmetric setting where two
welfare states provide higher education for their mobile students. Thus, we
show that also if the governments are not driven by exploitative incentives
but are welfare states, a competition effect may be identified that may drive
public provision of education upwards. Yet, the magnitude of this effect
is rather small. Second, we are the first to take into account that student
mobility is positively correlated with talent2, and that the talent distribution
is continuous. This assumption allows us to analyse how the relative weights
of free rider effect and competition effect change with increasing student
2Jahr, et al. (2002, p. 44ff) report that mobility of a graduate is positively correlated
with both the education level of the parents and her own mobility as a student. Given a
positive correlation between talent and the education level of parents, this finding provides
indirect evidence that student mobility and talent are positively correlated.
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mobility.
3 The Setup
We consider two symmetric countries A and B. Each country consists of an
infinite number of students with mass one. Students differ in two dimensions.
First, they differ in their learning ability τ which is uniformly distributed over
the unit interval [0, 1]. This learning ability represents a student’s general
ability to process, learn, and use new and complex information. It influences
both the returns from the student’s intellectual and multi–cultural training.
Second, students are heterogeneous with respect to their multi–cultural skills.
Some students acquire higher multi–cultural skills when studying abroad,
while others may benefit more from studying at home. Hence, if we represent
by a the relative gain in multi–cultural skills from studying abroad, then for
those students who benefit more from a foreign education the parameter a is
positive, whereas it is negative for other types of students. For tractability, we
assume that multi–cultural skills a are uniformly distributed over the interval
[−1/2, 1/2] and are independent of learning ability τ . Hence, a student k is
characterized by a learning ability τk ∈ [0, 1] and multi–cultural skill ak ∈
[−1/2, 1/2]. Students are fully informed about their characteristics and will
take them into account when deciding whether or not to study abroad.
Given the student’s population, each government i chooses university
quality qi, with the intention to maximize the welfare of its natives. Univer-
sity quality raises intellectual skills and therefore the productivity of students
who graduate from university.
Next, students choose the country in which they want to study. We
model mobility by assuming that only students who are above a given talent
level τˆ are mobile. This assumption captures the idea behind the Bologna
Process that more comparable universities increase student mobility. This
idea follows naturally from the simple fact that students must first learn
about foreign university systems before they decide whether to study abroad.
With more diverse systems, it is more difficult for a student to acquire and
process the relevant information. Hence, we view the Bologna Process as a
process that lowers the informational barriers to mobility; more divergent
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university systems represent higher informational barriers than standardized
ones. Since the ability to process information depends on the student ability
τ , only the more able students τ ≥ τˆ will find it worthwhile to obtain and
process the necessary information for deciding whether to study abroad.
A student’s return from a university education depends on the university’s
quality of education qi. In particular, a student k who is born in country i
with learning ability τk and multi–cultural skills ak attains a productivity of
piki = τqi
if she studies at home. If, instead, she studies abroad, her productivity
depends on the foreign university quality qj. In addition, her productivity
is affected by her multi–cultural skill ak. Thus, a foreign study yields a
productivity of
pikj = τ [qj +mak] .
The parameter m ≥ 0 thereby measures the relative importance of multi–
cultural skills. If these skills are unimportant, then m = 0. Otherwise,
m > 0.
Whether or not a mobile student migrates depends solely on how much
she will gain if she graduates at the foreign university, compared with her
gain from studying in her home country. We assume that the graduate
appropriates only a fraction γ < 1 of her productivity pi. The remaining
fraction (1− γ) is appropriated by the country in which the graduate works.
There are no direct migration costs. Consequently, a student k who has been
born in country i with multi–cultural skill ak, will migrate if and only if
γpiki ≥ γpikj ⇒ qj +mak > qi
Hence, given quality levels qi and qj, a student with multi–cultural skills
a¯ = (qi − qj)/m is indifferent about studying abroad. Consequently, all
students with multi-cultural skills a > ai
0
have an incentive to study abroad,
where3
ai
0
= max{−1/2,min{1/2, (qi − qj)/m}}.
3The maxmin expression takes account of possible corner solutions.
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study abroad
Figure 1: Students
Figure 1 illustrates the share of students who study abroad. Since stu-
dents are uniformly distributed, the number of students from country i ∈
{A,B} who study abroad is
nij =
(
1
2
− ai
0
)
(1− τˆ).
The remaining nii = 1− nij students study at home.
After students complete their studies, they start working and receive a
share γ from their productivity. The remaining share 1− γ is appropriated
by the country where the student works. We assume that students who
studied at home are immobile and therefore work in their home country.
Students who studied abroad return to their home country with an exogenous
probability ρ ∈ [0, 1].4 A share 1 − ρ remains in the foreign country. These
students will generate a positive externality of a magnitude (1 − γ) on the
foreign country.
Countries choose their university quality, qi, in order to maximize the
social welfare of its natives. Social welfare consists of four different compo-
nents: 1) the contribution to welfare of those students who study at home,
W iii; 2) the contribution of a country’s students who study abroad, W
i
ij; 3)
the contribution of foreign students who stay working in the country after
completing their studies, W iji; and 4) the costs that are generated by the
total sum of students studying at its university, Cii .
4The assumption captures the empirical fact (e.g., Jahr et al. 2002) that mobility
before and after graduation are positively correlated; mobile students are more likely to
emigrate than students who studied at home.
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A country appropriates the entire surplus of its own students that study
at home. As illustrated in Figure 1, there exist two types of students that
study at home: first, those students a < ai
0
who do not benefit from a
foreign education and, second, those students that, due to limited access to
information, are unable to study abroad. Since a home student of ability τ
obtains a productivity of τqi, their contribution to welfare is
W iii =
∫ ai
0
−
1
2
∫
1
0
τqidτda+
∫ 1
2
ai
0
∫ τˆ
0
τqidτda.
The contribution to welfare from students that study abroad will depend
on the number of students that return after their studies. Country i benefits
from the full productivity τ(qj +ma) of these students. But since a student
appropriates only a share γ of his productivity, a student (τ, a) who not only
studies but also stays abroad contributes only γτ(qj +ma) to his country’s
welfare. Hence, the contribution of students that study abroad is
W iij =
∫ 1
2
ai
0
∫
1
τˆ
[ρ+ (1− ρ)γ]τ(qj +ma)dτda.
Finally, a country appropriates a share (1− γ) of the productivity of
foreign students who, after their studies, remain in the country. The contri-
bution of these foreign students to social welfare is
W iji =
∫ 1
2
a
j
0
∫
1
τˆ
(1− ρ)(1− γ)τ(qi +ma)dτda.
The provision of quality is costly. The form of the cost function depends
on whether university quality is considered a public or a private good. If it
is a public good, the costs of providing a given quality level are independent
on the number of students who consume this quality. If it is a private good,
costs per quality increase with the number of consumers. Both assumptions
can be found in the literature. Therefore, we assume that university quality
has characteristics of both a public and a private good. In particular, country
i’s costs from providing quality qi are
Ci = k1q
2
i + k2qi(nii + nji).
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The importance of the public good’s and private good’s aspect of quality are
measured by the parameters k1 and k2 respectively.
To summarize, country i’s social welfare, W i, is the sum of the individual
components,
W i = W iii +W
i
ij +W
i
ji − C
i
i . (1)
Aggregate social welfare is
W = WA +WB. (2)
4 The First Best
If countries were able to coordinate their quality decision, they would agree
to implement the efficient level that maximizes aggregate social welfare W .
The following proposition derives the efficient quality level.
Proposition 1 The efficient level of quality is independent of the mobility
parameter τˆ and is qA = qB = qE, where
qE ≡
1− 2k2
4k1
.
As expected, the efficient level is decreasing in the cost parameters k1 and
k2. The efficient level, qE, does not depend on γ and ρ, because these pa-
rameters only determine how the graduate’s productivity is shared between
the two countries. In the aggregate, the division of rents is irrelevant. Fi-
nally, the proposition shows that the efficient quality level is independent of
student mobility τˆ . We obtain this independence result, because intellectual
and multi–cultural skills are additive separable components of the graduate’s
productivity. It implies that, from a social welfare perspective, there is no
trade–off between quality and mobility.
In a first best world, benevolent governments would not only implement
the efficient quality level of university education, but also choose an efficient
degree of student mobility. Since from an aggregate perspective there is no
trade–off between quality and mobility and because students take efficient
studying decisions, it is optimal to enable all students to develop their multi–
cultural skills. The next proposition formalizes this result.
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Proposition 2 If m = 0, any degree of student mobility is consistent with
the first best optimum. For m > 0, only full mobility τˆ = τˆ ∗ ≡ 0 is efficient.
In a first best world, quality levels are set at qA = qB = qE and students
enjoy full mobility when multi–cultural skills matter (m > 0). When these
skills do not matter, then also mobility does not play a role.
5 Immobile Students
Without the possibility of coordination, each country chooses qi indepen-
dently with the intention to maximize the social welfare Wi of its natives.
This may lead to distortions, because countries will only consider the effect
of their decisions on the social welfare of its natives. Yet, a special case
obtains when students are fully immobile (τˆ = 1). For this extreme, there
is no interaction between the countries. Each country incurs all the costs
from educating its citizens and also fully benefits from their productivity.
Consequently, countries choose the first best level of university quality.
Thus, restricting student mobility has the advantage that it yields efficient
investment decisions qE. A disadvantage is however that some students are
unable to develop their multi–cultural skills. Hence, in the case that such
skills matter (m > 0), the first best level of university quality comes at the
expense of inefficient cultural skills. The following proposition makes this
intuition more precise.
Proposition 3 If τˆ = 1, the countries choose the efficient quality levels
q∗A = q
∗
B = qE. The first best optimum is reached only if m = 0.
Hence, full efficiency is reached non–cooperatively when multi–cultural
skills do not matter. This result provides an initial justification for leaving
the choice of university quality in the hands of the member states of the
European Union. But as will be shown, no such justification is possible
when multi–cultural skills become part of human capital. As the European
Union’s economic integration progresses, multi–cultural skills become more
important and a total restriction on student mobility forecloses potential
gains from productivity.
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6 Mobile Students
When multi–cultural skills matter (m > 0), some graduates may increase
their productivity by developing their multi–cultural skills abroad. This
yields an efficiency argument in favor of student mobility. This section ana-
lyzes this argument in closer detail.
Without coordination, each country chooses its university quality qi with
the goal to maximize its social welfare W i. Whenever τˆ < 1, its optimal
quality choice depends on the choice of the neighboring country. Hence,
there exist strategic interactions. The following lemma derives the Nash
equilibrium levels that result from the strategic interaction.
Lemma 1 Suppose multi-cultural skills matter (m > 0), k1 > 1/m, and
k2 < 1/4.
5 Then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium (q∗A, q
∗
B) in pure
strategies. The Nash equilibrium is symmetric so that q∗A = q
∗
B = q
∗ with
q∗ ≡
(1− 4k2 + τˆ
2 + (1− τˆ 2)E)m
8mk1 + 8k2(1− τˆ)− 4(1− τˆ 2)E
(3)
and
E ≡ (1− ρ)(1− γ).
The lemma shows that, in general, the equilibrium level q∗ differs from
the efficient level qE. Countries’ non–cooperative investment decisions are
distorted away from the first best, because at the individual level countries
do not take into account the effect of their decisions on their neighbors. From
the equilibrium levels (3) we may identify two effects that distort choices: a
competition and a free rider effect. Since our main results depend on the
interplay of these two effects, we discuss them briefly before continuing our
analysis.
First, when foreign students remain in the hosting country after their
studies, the hosting country appropriates a part of their productivity. Con-
sequently, foreign students exert a positive externality on the social welfare
5The condition k1 > 1/m guarantees that the social welfare function W
i is concave in
qi for all parameters values of (γ, ρ, τ). Moreover, the reaction functions are falling for all
parameter values (γ, ρ, τ) whenever k2 < 1/4.
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of a country. The size of the externality is proportional to E = (1−ρ)(1−γ),
because foreign students stay with probability 1 − ρ and, in this case, the
hosting country appropriates a share 1−γ of their productivity. The positive
externality gives a country an incentive to attract foreign students. At the
same time, countries expect to lose a share E from the productivity of their
students who study abroad. The externality E therefore also measures the
incentive of a country to induce its natives to study at home. In the aggre-
gate, the parameter E measures the overall incentives of countries to raise
the quality of education in order to attract foreign students and keep their
own students from studying abroad. Thus, E is a measure of the competition
effect of student mobility that is claimed in the policy debates surrounding
the Bologna process.
The equilibrium levels (3) also reveal that quality choices are distorted
even when there is no competition effect E = 0. This is due to a negative free
riding effect. If τˆ < 1 countries may be tempted to educate their students
abroad in order to save on the cost of education. This option is especially
attractive if there does not exist a competition effect (E = 0). In this case,
there is no loss attached to educating one’s students abroad. Because a
country saves the cost k2 on each individual that is educated abroad, the free
riding effect is also stronger when the private good’s aspect of education, k2,
is larger.
Hence, whenever students are mobile (τˆ < 1) the countries’ investment
choices depend on the interplay between the competition effect and the free
rider effect. The remainder of this paper takes a closer look at how student
mobility affects this interplay.
7 Full Mobility
Section 5 explained that the disadvantage of immobility (τˆ = 0) is that stu-
dent’s cannot fully develop their multi–cultural skills. This section focuses
on the other extreme of full mobility (τˆ = 0), where students are able to
realize their multi–cultural skills to their full potential. Yet, as may be ex-
pected, this extreme generally leads to inefficient quality choices. Depending
on the relative strengths of the competition and free rider effect, these quality
choices will be either inefficiently low or inefficiently high.
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Proposition 4 At full mobility (τˆ = 0) the equilibrium level of university
quality is
q∗A = q
∗
B = q
∗ =
(1− 4k2 + E)m
8mk1 + 8k2 − 4E
.
For E = EH , the equilibrium is efficient. For E < EH equilibrium levels are
inefficiently low. For E > EH equilibrium levels are inefficiently high, where
EH ≡
mk1 + 2k2(1− 2k2)
mk1 + 1− 2k2
.
The proposition shows that only for the non–generic case E = EH full
mobility leads to a first best efficient outcome. In this special case, the
positive competition effect and the negative free riding effect balance each
other out exactly. Yet, in general we will have E 6= EH and, depending on
whether the students’ externality is smaller or larger than EH , full mobility
leads to either inefficiently low quality levels or inefficiently high quality
levels. Hence, when multi–cultural skills matter (m > 0) and E 6= EH , the
first best cannot be obtained. The two goals of Bologna of maximizing multi–
cultural skills and, at the same time, inducing efficient levels of university
quality are not fully compatible. In general, there exists a trade–off between
the two. The next section studies this trade–off in closer detail.
8 Intermediate Student Mobility
Section 5 showed that the extreme of fully immobile students (τˆ = 1) induces
efficient university quality choices, but leads to an inefficient development of
multi–cultural skills. In contrast, Section 7 obtained that the other extreme
of full mobility (τˆ = 0) leads to efficient development of skills, but ineffi-
cient quality choices. These results prompt us to study intermediate level of
student mobility.
In this section we show how the relative strength of the competition and
free rider effect vary with varying levels of student mobility. Moreover, we
study what levels of student mobility may be optimal from a second best
perspective which optimally trades off the effect that student mobility has
14
qE
τˆ
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Figure 2: Curve q∗(τˆ) for E < EL
on the choice of university quality and the development of multi–cultural
skills.
The previous section already indicated that the direction in which the
quality choices are distorted depends on the relative weights of the competi-
tion and free rider effect. In particular, when the free rider effect dominates,
the two countries choose inefficiently low quality levels. Clearly, when the
dominance of the free rider effect does not depend on student mobility, we
obtain a downward distortion for all levels of student mobility. The following
lemma shows that this occurs exactly when the externality E is smaller than
a critical threshold
EL ≡
mk1 + k2 (1− 2k2)
mk1 + 1− 2k2
.
Lemma 2 Suppose E < EL. Then the Nash equilibrium university quality
level q∗(τˆ) is increasing in τˆ .
The lemma demonstrates that, for small externalities (E < EL), the free
rider effect dominates the competition effect for all positive levels of student
mobility. As illustrated in Figure 2 this implies the following monotonic
relationship between university quality and student mobility. When students
are immobile (τˆ = 1), the countries choose an efficient level of quality, qE.
But due to the dominating free rider effect, an increase of student mobility
by lowering τˆ induces countries to lower their quality of education. The
downward distortion is strongest for full mobility (τˆ = 0).
The lemma further implies that with low externalities there exists a trade-
off between fostering multi–cultural skills and ensuring an optimal quality of
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education. The following proposition formalizes that the second best solution
will be a compromise and leads to an underprovision of quality.
Proposition 5 If E < EL, the second best optimum will be characterized
by incomplete student mobility τˆ ∈ (0, 1) and underprovision of university
quality q∗ < qE.
When externalities are low, there exists a monotonic relationship between
quality and student mobility. This raises the question, whether such a mon-
tonic relationship also exists for other levels of externalities. The following
lemma shows, however, that for externalities which exceed the level EL, the
monotonic relationship is lost. In particular, the relationship between q∗ and
τˆ is positive at τˆ = 0 and negative at τˆ = 1. Hence, when we regard quality
q∗ as a function of student mobility τˆ , then the curve q∗(τˆ) is increasing for
small τˆ and decreasing for larger values of τˆ .
Lemma 3 University quality q∗(τˆ) is increasing at τˆ = 0 for all E. Univer-
sity quality q∗(τˆ) is decreasing at τˆ = 1 if and only if E > EL.
Proposition 4 demonstrated that with full mobility (τˆ = 0) quality choices
are inefficiently low whenever E < EH . This result together with Lemma 3
implies that for intermediate values E ∈ (EL, EH) the relationship between
quality and mobility is as illustrated in Figure 3. For lower values of τˆ ,
the free riding effect dominates and quality is inefficiently low. For larger
values of τˆ the competition effect dominates and university quality levels are
inefficiently high. As illustrated in Figure 3, there exists a threshold value
τ¯ at which the free rider and the competition effect cancel each other out,
resulting in an efficient level of quality qE. The following lemma formalizes
this reasoning.
Lemma 4 If EL < E < EH , the university quality q
∗(τˆ) is increasing at
τˆ = 0 and decreasing at τˆ = 1. There exists a unique τ¯ ∈ (0, 1) with q∗ (τ¯) =
qE. The derivative of q
∗(τˆ) is continuous.
Intuitively, the non–monotonic relationship between quality distortion
and student mobility is due to the composition effect. With increasing stu-
dent mobility, the average talent of students who study abroad decreases.
16
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τˆ
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Figure 3: Curve q∗(τˆ) for EL < E < EH
Consequently, higher mobility reduces the average gain in productivity from
these students. In addition, the average talent of foreign students also de-
clines with higher student mobility. As a result, it becomes less attractive to
attract these students, because the average productivity gain from them will
be lower. Since the costs of education are independent of a student’s quality,
the reduction in the average talent of mobile students reduces the importance
of the competition effect relative to the free rider effect. This is exactly what
happens for intermediate values of E. In this case, the competition effect is
only strong enough to outweigh the free rider effect when the average talent
of the mobile students is high.
We now study the optimal second best student mobility τˆ ∗ with interme-
diate externalities. First, note that for τˆ > τ¯ there is no meaningful trade–off
between quality and student mobility. A level of mobility τˆ = τ¯ leads to both
a more efficient acquisition of multi–cultural skills and a more efficient qual-
ity of education than any level τˆ > τ¯ . As a consequence, the optimal level of
student mobility lies below τ¯ and leads to an underprovision of educational
quality. This is formalized by the following proposition.
Proposition 6 For EL < E < EH , the second best optimum τˆ
∗ will be
smaller than τ¯ and larger than zero. It induces an underprovision of univer-
sity quality q∗ < qE.
Proposition 6 is the counterpart of Proposition 5 for intermediate exter-
nality levels. Both propositions yield qualitatively equivalent results. For
both low and intermediate externality levels, neither full mobility, (τˆ = 0),
nor full immobility, (τˆ = 1), is optimal. In contrast, the optimal second
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best level of student mobility is intermediate, (τˆ ∗ ∈ (0, 1)), and yields an
underprovision of university quality.
Finally, we address the possibility that mobile students exercise a con-
siderably high externality on their hosting country (E > EH). According
to Lemma 3 quality is decreasing in the degree of student mobility for low
levels of student mobility and increasing for higher levels. This result reflects
again the composition effect. For low levels of mobility the average talent
of the mobile student is high and the competition effect outweighs the free
rider effect. As student mobility increases, the average talent of the mobile
student decreases and the free riding effect becomes relatively more impor-
tant. Yet, for E > EH the competition is so strong that it remains to outdo
the free rider effect even at the extreme of full mobility (τˆ = 0). This result
is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 If E > EH , university quality q
∗(τˆ) is increasing at τˆ = 0 and
decreasing at τˆ = 1. Moreover, q∗(τˆ) > qE for all τˆ ∈ [0, 1). The curve q
∗(τˆ)
obtains a unique maximum at τ˜ ∈ (0, 1) with q∗(τ˜) > qE. There exists a
unique τ ′ ∈ (τ˜ , 1) such that q∗(τ ′) = q∗(0).
Figure 4 illustrates the lemma graphically. The curve q∗(τˆ) is decreasing
for τˆ > τ˜ . This reflects the range where the competition effect outweighs the
free rider effect. Yet, for lower τˆ the composition effect reduces the relative
strength of the competition effect. At τˆ = τ˜ the free rider effect is gaining
the overhand, and a further reduction in τˆ reduces the distortion in quality.
Yet, for E > EH the initial competition effect is too strong for the free rider
effect to eliminate the upward distortion in quality and reverse it. Hence,
the curve exceeds the efficient level qE.
Finally, we address the second best level of student mobility τˆ ∗. For the
range (0, τ ′] there exists no meaningful trade–off between quality of education
and student mobility. In comparison to any level τˆ ∈ (0, τ ′], full mobility
(τˆ = 0) leads to both a more efficient acquisition of multi–cultural skills
and a more efficient quality of education. As a consequence, the optimal
level of student mobility lies either at τˆ = 0 or τˆ ∈ (τ ′, 1). Hence, for
high externalities, the strong competition effect leads to an overprovision of
educational quality.
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τ˜ τ ′
qE
q∗(0)
τˆ
10
Figure 4: Curve q∗(τˆ) for E > EH
Proposition 7 If E > EH , the second best optimum is characterized by an
overprovision of university quality q∗ > qE and either full student mobility
τˆ = 0 or positive but incomplete student mobility τˆ ∗ ∈ (τ ′, 1).
A comparison of Proposition 7 to Propositions 5 and 6 reveals that qual-
itative results for large externalities E > EH differ from those obtained for
smaller externalities E < EH . In particular, we obtain an overprovision of
university quality for E > EH against an underprovision of university quality
for E < EH .
9 Conclusion
The Bologna Process is meant to increase student mobility, which, in its turn,
is to raise the productivity of European graduates due to two effects. First,
mobility is supposed to kindle competition among the union’s member states
to attract the best students. This competition effect induces governments to
raise the quality of their universities. At the same time, higher mobility is
expected to provide graduates with higher multi–cultural skills. These skills
are believed to become more and more important in a union that strives
for economic integration while preserving the diversity of its cultures. The
current paper examines the economic rationale behind these arguments. It
studies the economic effects of student mobility on both the acquisition of
multi–cultural skills and the quality of university education.
We obtain a trade–off between multi–cultural skills and university quality.
When students are fully immobile, there is no interaction between countries
and governments choose the efficient level of university quality; but, because
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no multi–cultural skills are gained, efficient university quality comes at the
expense of inefficiently low multi–cultural skills. A reversed inefficiency can
be observed in the other extreme where students are fully mobile. In this
case, students acquire an efficient level of multi–cultural skills, but university
quality is generally inefficient because the countries do not internalize the
externalities between them. Thus, we do not find a mobility level that induces
both efficient quality and an efficient acquisition of multi–cultural skills. As
a consequence, optimal mobility levels will have to trade–off inefficiencies in
university quality against inefficiencies in multi–cultural skills.
The direction in which student mobility distorts university quality de-
pends on the relative strength of a positive competition and a negative free
rider effect. If the free rider effect outweighs the competition effect, the
quality of university education will be inefficiently low and vice versa.
Higher student mobility increases the relative strength of the free rider
effect in its relation to the competition effect. As student mobility increases,
the talent pool of mobile students decreases. Due to this composition effect,
a country’s incentives to attract foreign students declines. At the same time,
higher mobility also lowers the average talent of immobile students. This
composition effect weakens a country’s incentive to retain native students.
Hence, both composition effects strengthen the free rider effect at the expense
of the competition effect. As a consequence we obtain that only if the initial
competition effect is particularly strong, compared to the initial free rider
effect, university quality exceeds efficient levels. Thus we conclude that,
at an optimal second best level of student mobility, an underprovision of
university quality is more likely to occur.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We solve the maximization problem maxqA,qB W (qA, qB).
The functionW (qA, qB) is continuous, but, due to corner conditions, consists
of three parts. Whenever |qA − qB| ≤ m/2 we have
W (qA, qB) = [4m(qA − 2qA(k2 + k1qA) + qB − 2qB(k2 + k1qB))
+m2(1− τˆ) + 4(qA − qB)
2(1− τˆ 2 − 4k2(1− τˆ))]/(8m).
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Since W is concave in qA, qB, first order conditions are sufficient and yield
qA = qB = (1− 2k2)/(4k1).
Whenever qA − qB > m/2 we have a
0
A = −1/2 and a
0
B = 1/2 so that
W (qA, qB) = [2m(qB − k1(q
2
A + q
2
B) + (qA − qB)τˆ
2)
−(2k2(m(qA + qB) + 2(qA − qB)
2(1− τˆ)]/(2m)
This expression is concave in (qA, qB) so that first order conditions are suffi-
cient. First order condition yield qA−qB = −m(1− τˆ
2)/(2k1m+8k2(1− τˆ) <
0, which violates qA − qB > m/2. Hence, there is no internal maximum for
W on the domain qA − qB > m/2.
Whenever qA − qB < −m/2 we have a
0
A = 1/2 and a
0
B = −1/2 so that
W (qA, qB) = [2m(qA(1− k2 − k1qA)− k2qB − k1q
2
B)
−4k2(qA − qB)
2(1− τˆ)−m(qA − qB)τˆ
2]/(2m)
This expression is concave in (qA, qB) so that first order conditions are suffi-
cient. First order condition yield qA−qB = m(1− τˆ
2)/(2k1m+8k2(1− τˆ) > 0,
which violates qA − qB < −m/2. Hence, there is no internal maximum for
W on the domain qA − qB < −m/2.
Since W (qA, qB) is continuous over its entire domain, the maximum is
unique and obtained for
qA = qB =
1− 2k2
4k1
.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Substitution of qA = qB = qE into W (qA, qB) and
a rearrangement of terms yields
W (qE, qE) =
mk1(1− τˆ
2) + (1− 2k2)
2
8k1
.
For m = 0 this expression is independent of τˆ . For m > 0 the expression is
strictly decreasing for τˆ > 0. Hence, τˆ = 0 is optimal. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Follows directly from Proposition 1 and 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1: The pair (q∗A, q
∗
B) is a Nash equilibrium whenever
q∗A = argmaxqA
WA(qA, q
∗
B) and q
∗
B = argmaxqB
WB(q
∗
A, qB).
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Whenever k1 > 1/m and k2 < 1/4 the solution, for |qA − qB| ≤ m/2, is
qA = qB = q
∗ =
(1− 4k2 + τˆ
2 + (1− τˆ 2)E)m
8mk1 + 8k2(1− τˆ)− 4(1− τˆ 2)E
,
which is consistent with the assumption |qA − qB| ≤ m/2.
We now show that qA < qB −m/2 is not a best response to qB = q
∗. For
qA < qB −m/2 the social welfare of country A is
WA = WA
1
≡ τˆ 2qA/2 + (1− E)(1− τˆ
2)qB/2− k1q
2
A − k2τˆ qA.
Not that for the range qA ∈ [0, qB −m/2] the expression
∂WA
1
/∂qA = τˆ
2/2− 2k1qA − k2τˆ
is maximized for qA = qB −m/2. For qB = q
∗ it then follows
∂WA
1
∂qA
= τˆ 2/2− k2τˆ − 2k1
(
m(1 + E − 4k2 + τˆ
2(1− E))
8(k2(1− τˆ) + k1m)− 4E(1− τˆ 2)
−
m
2
)
.
This expression is decreasing in E so that the expression is smallest for E = 1:
∂WA
1
∂qA
= τˆ 2/2− k2τˆ − 2k1
(
m(2− 4k2)
8(k2(1− τˆ) + k1m)− 4(1− τˆ 2)
−
m
2
)
.
For k1 > 1/m and k2 < 1/4 the expression is positive. This shows that
WA(qA, q
∗) is increasing on qA ∈ [0, q
∗ −m/2) so that qA ∈ [0, q
∗ −m/2) is
not a best response to qB = q
∗.
Next we show that also qA > qB +m/2 is not a best response to qB = q
∗.
For qA > qB +m/2 it follows
WA = WA
2
≡ qA(1− 4k2 + E(1− τˆ
2)− 2k1qA + 2k2τˆ)/2
Hence,
∂WA
2
∂qA
= (1− 4k2 + E(1− τˆ
2)− 4k1qA + 2k2τˆ)/2 (4)
for qA > qB +m/2. For k1 > 1/m, k2 < 1/4, and qB = q
∗ it may be shown
that expression (4) evaluated at qA = q
∗ +m/2 is negative. From this and
the fact that (4) is decreasing in qA it follows that W
A(qA, q
∗) is decreasing
for qA > q
∗ +m/2 so that qA > q
∗ +m/2 is not a best response to qB = q
∗.
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It follows that qA = q
∗ is a best response to qB = q
∗. Due to symmetry
qB = q
∗ is also a best response to qA = q
∗. Therefore qA = qB = q
∗ is the
unique symmetric equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Substitution of τˆ = 0 in equation (3) and its
comparison to qE yields the result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: Taking the derivative of (3) with respect to τˆ yields
dq∗
dτˆ
=
k2(1− 4k2 + E) + 2((mk1 + k2)(1− E)− E)τˆ − k2(1− E)τˆ
2
2(2(mk1 + (1− τˆ)k2)− E(1− τˆ 2))2/m
. (5)
Since the denominator of (5) is strictly positive, this derivative is continuous
for all τˆ ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, the numerator determines its sign. Because the
numerator is quadratic in τˆ with a negative coefficient −k2(1− E) < 0, the
sign of dq∗/dτˆ changes at most once on τˆ ∈ [0, 1]. Due to k2 < 1/4, the
numerator is positive at τˆ = 0. Hence, the sign changes if and only if the
numerator in (5) evaluated at τˆ = 1 is negative. That is whenever
E >
mk1 + k2(1− 2k2)
mk1 + 1− 2k2
.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: After a substitution of the Nash values (3) into the
aggregate social welfare function (2), we may rewrite the change in welfare
as
dW
dτˆ
=
dq(τˆ)
dτˆ
[qE − q(τˆ)]−
τˆm
4
. (6)
Since q(1) = qE the evaluation of the derivative at τˆ = 1 yields −m/4. Hence,
aggregate social welfare is decreasing at τˆ = 1. The derivative evaluated at
τˆ = 0 yields
(1− 4k2 + E)k2m[(1− E)k1m+ (2k2 − E)(1− 2k2)]
2(2(k2 + k1m)− E)3
This expression is positive if and only if E < EH . Hence, for E < EL < EH ,
aggregate social welfare is increasing at τˆ = 0 and decreasing at τˆ = 1 It
follows for the optimal degree of mobility that τˆ ∗ ∈ (0, 1). From Proposition
3 and Lemma 3 it follows that there is an underprovision of quality. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 3: The statement is a corollary of the proof of Lemma 2.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: In the proof of Lemma 2 we established that ∂q∗/∂τˆ
is continuous on τˆ ∈ [0, 1], changes sign at most once, and has at most one
maximum. Moreover, the proof of Lemma 2 established that ∂q∗/∂τˆ at τˆ = 0
is positive, so that q∗ is increasing at τˆ = 0.
Evaluation of ∂q∗/∂τˆ at τˆ = 1 yields
∂q∗
∂τˆ
|τˆ=1=
(1− E)k1m+ (1− 2k2)(k2 − E)
4k21m
,
which is negative for E > EL. Hence, q
∗ is decreasing at τˆ = 1.
Since q∗ at τˆ = 0 exceeds qE and, due to Proposition 4, q
∗ is smaller than
qE at τˆ = 1, continuity of ∂q
∗/∂τˆ and the fact that it changes sign only once
imply that there exists a unique τ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that q∗(τ¯) = qE. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: By Lemma 4 there exists a unique τ¯ ∈ (0, 1)
such that q(τˆ) < qE for all τˆ ∈ (0, τ¯) and q(τˆ) > qE for all τˆ ∈ (τ¯ , 1).
Since q∗(1) = qE the continuity of q(τˆ) implies that there exists a maximum
q(τ˜) > qE at some τ˜ ∈ (τ¯ , 1). We first establish that τˆ > τ˜ cannot be
optimal. To see this, observe there exists a τ ′ ∈ [τ¯ , τ˜) such that q(τ ′) = q(τˆ).
Consequently, the difference in aggregate welfare can be expressed as
W (τˆ)−W (τ ′) =
∫ τˆ
τ ′
dW
dτˆ
dτ =
∫ τˆ
τ ′
∂W
∂τˆ
dτ =
∫ τˆ
τ ′
−
mτ
4
dτ < 0,
where the second equality follows because q(τ ′) = q(τˆ). Hence, τˆ > τ˜ is not
optimal.
Second we establish that τˆ ∈ [τ¯ , τ˜) cannot be optimal. This follows from
the observation (6) that
dW
dτˆ
=
dq
dτˆ
[qE − q(τˆ)]− τˆ /4.
Since for τˆ ∈ [τ¯ , τ˜) we have dq/dτˆ < 0 and q(τˆ) > qE) the expression dW/dτˆ
is negative for any τˆ ∈ [τ¯ , τ˜).
Consequently, the second best optimum is characterized by some τˆ ∈
(0, τ¯). As for τˆ < τ¯ , it follows q(τˆ) < qE, there is underprovision of quality.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 5: All but the last statement follow directly from the
proof of Lemma 4. The last statement follows from the fact that q∗(τ˜) >
q∗(0) > qE = q
∗(1). Hence, continuity of q∗(.) implies existence of τ ′ ∈ (τ˜ , 1)
such that q∗(τ ′) = q∗(0). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: For any τˆ ∈ (τ˜ , τ ′) there exists a τ ∈ (0, τ˜)
with q(τ) = q(τˆ). Consequently, the difference in aggregate welfare can be
expressed as
W (τˆ)−W (τ) =
∫ τˆ
τ
dW
dτˆ
(t)dt =
∫ τˆ
τ
∂W
∂τˆ
(t)dτ =
∫ τˆ
τ
−
mτ
4
dτ < 0,
where the second equality follows because q(τ) = q(τˆ). Hence, τˆ ∈ (τ˜ , τ ′) is
not optimal.
Equation (6) implies that whenever q∗(τ) > qE and q
∗(τ) is decreasing,
then aggregate welfare W (τˆ) is decreasing in τˆ . Consequently, τˆ ∈ (0, τ˜)
cannot be optimal.
Hence, the second best τˆ lies either in the interval (τ ′, 1) or at 0. Q.E.D.
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